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We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-
person gift-exchange game experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two 
agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. We find that both agents supply more effort in 
response to a higher own wage, even though supplying minimal effort maximizes own-earnings. 
In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agent's effort is influenced by the effort 
choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents. This peer 
effect is consistent with inequity aversion and we also show, by conducting an experiment to 
measure social norms, that it is consistent with social norm compliance. We design a second 
treatment where social norm compliance, but not inequity aversion, predicts this peer effect. In 
this treatment we do not observe peer effects. Our results suggest that, in our context, inequity 
aversion provides a parsimonious explanation for observed peer effects. 
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1. Introduction 
A large body of experimental evidence challenges the assumption that individuals act 
exclusively to maximize their narrowly-defined self-interest. In simple games such as the dictator 
game, the investment game and the gift-exchange game, individuals often choose to reduce their 
own earnings in order to increase the earnings of their opponent, even in non-repeated and 
anonymous interactions where there are no positive future consequences associated with 
behaving pro-socially (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003). More recently, several studies of peer effects 
show that the extent to which people behave pro-socially is sensitive to whether they observe 
others doing so.
1  
Previous studies have typically interpreted these peer effects by referring to one of two 
different behavioral mechanisms. One view is that pro-social behavior originates from pressures 
to comply with norms of ‘socially appropriate’ behavior in a given context (e.g., Bicchieri, 2006; 
Keizer et al., 2008). Here observing what others do can affect individuals’ actions by influencing 
what they perceive to constitute appropriate behavior in a given situation. The alternative view 
emphasizes the role of stable social preferences, which can also predict non-selfish behavior and, 
as we show below, peer effects. Our paper reports experiments designed to separate these two 
leading explanations of pro-social behavior and peer effects.  
Our starting point is a three-person gift-exchange game described in Section 2. In the 
experiment subjects are grouped in experimental ‘firms’ composed of three members: ‘Employer’, 
‘Employee 1’ and ‘Employee 2’. Employers choose wages for their employees, who choose costly 
effort in return. A key feature of the game is that, before making an effort choice, Employee 2 is 
informed of the co-worker’s effort choice. Previous studies with this type of experimental setting 
have found that the availability of information about others’ efforts has a systematic influence on 
Employee 2’s decisions: in particular, when the Employer pays high wages to both employees 
Employee 2 expends more effort when she observes her co-worker supplying more effort, despite 
the fact that there are no earnings interdependencies between the employees. The behavioral 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Cason and Mui (1998); Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) and Krupka and Weber (2009) in the dictator game; 
Gächter et al. (2010) and Thöni and Gächter (2011) in the gift-exchange game; Mittone and Ploner (forthcoming) in 
the investment game. Related, in public goods game experiments many people are ‘conditional cooperators’ who are 
willing to contribute in proportion to what others contribute (see, e.g., Falk et al., 2010; Fischbacher and Gächter, 
2010). The importance of conditional cooperation has also been documented in a number of recent field experiments 
(Chen et al., 2010; Shang and Croson, 2009; Alpizar et al., 2008; Croson and Shang, 2008; Martin and Randal, 2008; 
Frey and Meier, 2004).  
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mechanism underlying this peer effect is unclear. We show that a model of social preferences 
where individuals dislike inequitable distributions of earnings (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) can 
explain this effect. However, social norm compliance can also explain the positive relation 
between employees’ efforts: as we describe in Section 3, using a norms-elicitation procedure 
introduced by Krupka and Weber (2010) we find that the co-worker’s effort decisions 
systematically affect the perception of what constitutes an appropriate effort response by Employee 
2 to a high wage offer. 
In this paper we disentangle these two possible explanations for peer effects in pro-social 
behavior. Our experiment, described in Section 4, consists of two main treatments. The BASELINE 
treatment uses the same game used in previous studies, and both the social preferences approach 
and the social norms approach are consistent with a positive relation between employees’ efforts. 
Our RANDOM treatment modifies the game used in BASELINE as follows: after all firm 
members have made a decision one of the employees is randomly selected, and only the wage 
and effort decisions regarding the selected employee are implemented and have consequences for 
the computation of earnings. In such a setting models of social preferences predict no correlation 
between employees’ efforts. However, our norms-elicitation procedure for RANDOM reveals 
that the co-worker’s effort decisions still influence what is perceived to be an appropriate 
response by Employee 2 to a high wage offer. Thus, observing a positive relation between 
employees’ efforts in RANDOM is consistent with social norms compliance. 
We describe our results in Section 5. Our BASELINE treatment successfully reproduces the 
finding that Employees 2’s effort decisions are significantly influenced by the co-worker’s effort 
decisions. However, this effect vanishes in RANDOM where Employees 2’s choices are not 
affected by the co-worker’s choices. Thus peer effects in effort decisions are always evident in 
the elicited social norms, but not in the behavioral data. Peer effects are observed only when 
predicted by inequity aversion.  
Peer effects are observed in our data when both employees are paid the same high wage. In 
Section 6 we address the question whether peer effects are robust to situations in which employees 
are treated generously but asymmetrically. We report an ASYMMETRIC treatment in which we 
introduce small wage asymmetries in the high wage combination. This has only minor effects on 
the predictions from inequity aversion relative to the BASELINE treatment, but might have more  
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noticeable effects on social norm compliance due to the existence of ‘moral wiggle’ opportunities. 
In fact we again find clear peer effects in the elicited social norms as well as in the behavioral data.  
The patterns of behavior observed in each treatment are consistent with inequity aversion. 
The patterns are not consistent with elicited social norms when social norms and inequity 
aversion make differing predictions. This suggests that an approach that emphasizes the role of 
stable social preferences can parsimoniously explain peer effects in pro-social behavior in our 
context. However, we also observe differences across treatments in the proportion of individuals 
who are willing to engage in pro-social behavior, and this is more difficult to reconcile with 
inequity aversion. In Section 7 we discuss this result and related studies that have examined the 
predictive power of social norms and social preference approaches in experimental games.  
2. Peer Effects in Trilateral Gift-Exchange Games 
We examine peer effects in pro-social behavior using a three-person version of the standard 
gift-exchange game (Fehr et al., 1993). In the trilateral gift-exchange game ‘firms’ are composed 
of three members: one ‘Employer’ and two ‘Employees’. The game begins with the Employer 
choosing wages for the two employees. Wages are publicly observed before employees choose 
costly effort which is beneficial to the Employer. Previous experimental work with this type of 
game shows the existence of a positive ‘own-wage effect’: employees often reciprocate higher 
wage offers with higher effort, as in standard two-person gift-exchange game experiments. 
However, previous studies also show that the presence of information about the co-worker’s wage 
and/or effort can systematically affect the magnitude of this own wage effect. Some of these 
studies focus on the effects of wage comparisons with mixed results: in some cases information 
about co-workers’ wages systematically affects employees’ effort decisions (e.g., Abeler et al., 
2010; Gächter and Thöni, 2010; Nosenzo, 2010), while in other cases such effects are weak or 
absent (e.g., Gächter et al., 2010; Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Güth et al., 2001). Other 
experimental studies focus on effort comparison effects, i.e. on how information about co-
workers’ effort choices affect an employee’s effort decisions when there are no earnings 
interdependencies between the employees. Both Gächter et al. (2010, GNS henceforth) and Thöni 
and Gächter (2011) find that when the effort of the co-worker is publicly observable employees’ 
willingness to reciprocate high wage offers depends on whether the co-worker is also willing to do  
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so. Thus, a positive and systematic correlation between employees’ efforts has been documented 
in trilateral gift-exchange game experiments. 
Our study is based on the three-person gift-exchange game used by GNS. Their game has 
three players labeled ‘Employer’, ‘Employee 1’ and ‘Employee 2’. All players move 
sequentially: the Employer moves first and chooses a wage  {} 32 , 16 ∈ i w  for each Employee 
{} 2 , 1 ∈ i . Employee 1 observes both wages and then chooses an effort level  {} 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 1 ∈ e . 
Finally, Employee 2 observes both wages and the effort chosen by Employee 1, and then chooses 
an effort level  {} 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 2 ∈ e . After Employee 2’s choice, the game ends and the Employer’s 
earnings are computed as: 
() 2 1 2 1 10 w w e e ER − − + ⋅ = π       ( 1 )  
and employee i’s earnings are computed as: 
() 1 5 − ⋅ − = i i i e w π        ( 2 )  
In their experiment, GNS implemented a one-shot version of this game using the strategy 
method (Selten, 1967), i.e. subjects have to make contingent decisions for all nodes at which they 
may have to play. Thus, each Employee 2 made sixteen effort choices, one for each possible 
combination of wages and effort chosen by the Employer and Employee 1. Figure 1 shows the 
average effort expended by Employees 2 in each contingency. 
Figure 1: Employees 2 average effort in the GNS experiment 
 
Employee 2’s average effort in the experiment by Gächter, 
Nosenzo and Sefton (2010) (n=28).  
As in many other gift-exchange game experiments, GNS observe a positive own-wage 
effect: Employees 2 reward the Employer with higher effort when they are paid a higher wage. 
GNS also observe a peer effect when both employees are paid a high wage. Here Employee 2 
strongly reciprocates the high wage if Employee 1 expends high effort, but chooses low effort if  
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Employee 1 expends minimal effort.
2 Thöni and Gächter (2011) also find peer effects in a closely 
related trilateral gift-exchange game experiment using the direct response method. 
What underlies these peer effects? In the next sub-sections we discuss two alternative 
explanations: models of social preferences and social norm compliance.   
2.1. Explaining Peer Effects: the Social Preferences Approach 
Thöni and Gächter (2011) show that the positive correlation between employees’ efforts 
observed in their experiment can be explained by the model of inequity aversion proposed by 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 (FS), but not by other leading models of social preferences. This is also 
the case for the game used by GNS.
3  
Our analysis focuses on the subgames starting when Employee 2 chooses effort. An 
Employee 2 motivated by inequity aversion is assumed to have a utility function: 
{} { } () {} { } () 0 , max 0 , max
2
0 , max 0 , max
2




2 1 2 2 π π π π
β
π π π π
α
π π π π − + − − − + − − = ER ER ER U
where  ER π  and  {} 2 , 1 ∈ i π  are respectively the Employer’s and employee i’s material payoff from the 
game. The parameter  2 α  measures the strength of the employee’s aversion to disadvantageous 
payoff inequality, and  2 β  measures the strength of the employee’s aversion to advantageous 
inequality. As in FS, we assume  2 2 β α ≥  and  1 0 2 < ≤ β . 
The model prediction depends on the degree of ‘superiority aversion’  2. β If Employee 2 is 
not sufficiently superiority averse (i.e.,  2 / 1 2 ≤ β  for the GNS parameters), she will choose 
minimal effort irrespective of the wage she is offered and of the wage and effort of the co-
worker. On the contrary, a sufficiently superiority averse Employee 2 ( 2 / 1 2 ≥ β ) may choose 
non-minimal effort as shown in Figure 2.  
                                                 
2 The correlations between employees’ efforts in the other three wage combinations are statistically insignificant. 
3 Models that assume that players care about payoff comparisons but do not assume that Employee 2 directly 
compares her payoff with Employee 1’s payoff (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) 
predict that employees’ efforts are negatively related. The model by Charness and Rabin (2002) assumes that 
Employee 2 directly compares her payoff with Employee 1’s payoff when the latter is the least well off among the 
three firm members. This is not the case in the wage combinations where both wages are high, and so the model does 
not predict a positive relation between efforts for this wage combination. Models of altruism (Cox et al., 2007; 2008) 
predict a negative relation of efforts. Pure reciprocity models (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) do not 
predict any relation between employees’ efforts because the effort chosen by one employee has no impact on the 
payoff of the other employee.  
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Figure 2: FS predictions for the GNS game 
 
Predicted effort choices of a superiority averse Employee 2 
( 2 / 1 2 ≥ β ). 
Note how these predictions bear out the two most distinctive features of the GNS 
experiment reproduced in Figure 1: firstly, the positive own-wage effect whereby higher effort is 
chosen in response to a higher wage, and secondly, the strong positive relation between 
employees’ efforts in the wage combination where both wages are high. In the model, the own-
wage effect results from Employee 2’s superiority aversion: when she is paid a high wage, 
Employee 2 is generally better off than the other firm members. By choosing non-minimal effort 
levels she can reduce the advantageous payoff differences relative to the Employer and Employee 
1 and attain more equitable earnings distributions. The one-to-one complementary relation 
between employees’ efforts when both employees are paid a high wage results from the fact that 
Employee 2 is generally unwilling to choose non-minimal effort if by doing so her payoff falls 
(too much) short of the payoff of another firm member. Thus, when matched with a highly-paid 
co-worker, Employee 2 is willing to expend effort and reduce advantageous payoff inequalities 
only to the extent to which the co-worker is also willing to do so.
4 
2.2. Explaining Peer Effects: the Social Norms Approach 
Peer effects could also be the result of pressures to comply with norms of ‘socially 
appropriate’ behavior, i.e., collectively recognized rules of conduct that prescribe socially 
acceptable behaviors in a given situation. The literature typically distinguishes between two 
different types of norms (see, e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Keizer et al., 2008): ‘injunctive’ norms, 
defining what one ought to do in a given situation, and ‘descriptive’ norms, reflecting what actually 
constitutes ‘normal’ or ‘regular’ behavior in a given situation. A relevant injunctive norm that may 
                                                 
4 Note that the model generates a (somewhat weaker) negative relation between employees’ efforts when Employee 2 
is paid a high wage and the co-worker a low wage. This results from the fact that Employee 2 would earn less than the 
Employer if she chose maximum effort when the co-worker chooses 3 or 4 units of effort: then, she prefers to reduce 
her effort by one unit. GNS observe a negative but statistically insignificant correlation between efforts in this case.  
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exist in the GNS experiment is the ‘norm of reciprocity’ whereby individuals respond with 
kindness/unkindness to kind/unkind actions by others (see, e.g., Gouldner, 1960; Cialdini, 2001). 
In the context of the experiment, the norm of reciprocity would prescribe that employees choose 
higher effort in response to higher wage offers made by employers. Descriptive norms are informed 
by observation of others’ behavior in comparable situations. In the GNS experiment, observing 
how the co-worker responds to a high wage offer may systematically influence Employees 2’s 
perception of what constitutes an appropriate reciprocal response to a high wage offer. Thus, if a 
descriptive social norm exists in the GNS experiment and behavior is guided by such norms, 
Employees 2’s effort choice may be systematically influenced by the co-worker’s effort choice. 
Explaining phenomena by appealing to the influence of social norms can be problematic 
because of the difficulties of precisely identifying and measuring norms. In particular, often what 
may or may not constitute a norm is based on intuition or casual empiricism. For a more 
objective approach toward identifying whether social norms are relevant to the experimental 
environment studied by GNS, and whether they can explain the patterns of behavior discussed 
above, we adapted an experimental norms-elicitation procedure recently introduced by Krupka 
and Weber (2010) for dictator games. We describe this procedure for our trilateral gift-exchange 
game in the next section. 
3. Identifying Social Norms in the Trilateral Gift-Exchange Game 
The norms-elicitation experiment consisted of one session with 51 students recruited at 
the University of Nottingham and paid £5 for their participation. Upon arrival subjects learnt that 
their task was to read a description of four different ‘situations’ in which a ‘decision-maker’ had 
to choose among a number of possible alternative actions.
5 The situations reproduced the 
following four possible contingencies faced by Employees 2 in the GNS experiment:
6  
1) Employer pays a wage of 32 to Employee 1 and a wage of 16 for Employee 2. Employee 1 
chooses 1 unit of effort; 
2) Employer pays a wage of 32 to Employee 1 and a wage of 16 for Employee 2. Employee 1 
chooses 4 units of effort; 
3) Employer pays a wage of 32 to both employees. Employee 1 chooses 1 unit of effort; 
                                                 
5 Instructions for the norms-elicitation experiment are reproduced in Appendix B2.  
6 We only elicited judgments about four of the sixteen possible situations faced by Employees 2 in order to keep the 
size of the task and the duration of the experiment reasonable for subjects.  
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4) Employer pays a wage of 32 to both employees. Employee 1 chooses 4 units of effort. 
These situations were chosen to identify any norm of reciprocity (Situation 1 vs. Situation 
3, and Situation 2 vs. Situation 4), and to examine how normative judgments are affected by 
observation of co-workers’ actions (Situation 1 vs. Situation 2, and Situation 3 vs. Situation 4). 
For each of these situations and for each effort choice available to Employee 2 subjects 
had to rate whether the effort choice was ‘very socially appropriate’, ‘somewhat socially 
appropriate’, ‘somewhat socially inappropriate’, or ‘very socially inappropriate’. Subjects were 
told that at the end of the session the experimenter would randomly select one of the four 
situations, and one possible effort choice in that situation. Subjects received an additional £3 if 
their appropriateness rating for the selected situation and choice matched the modal rating of 
other subjects in the session. Thus, subjects were given incentives to reveal their perception of the 
most prevalent appropriateness judgment in the session, and not their personal judgment.
7 
The main results of our norms-elicitation experiment can be gauged by the following 
exercise (see Appendix A1 for a summary of subjects’ appropriateness ratings across the four 
situations they evaluated). Assume that, if asked to make an effort choice in the role of Employee 
2 in each of the four situations they evaluated, the 51 raters in our experiment would select the 
level of effort that they evaluated as the ‘most’ socially appropriate for that situation.
8 Figure 3 
shows the average effort that our 51 raters would then expend in each of the four situations that 
they were asked to evaluate.  
 Figure  3: Socially most appropriate effort choices in the trilateral gift-exchange game   
 
Effort choices that the 51 raters would make on average if they chose the 
most socially appropriate effort level in the four situations they evaluated. 
                                                 
7 See Krupka and Weber (2010) for a discussion of how the use of such ‘pure matching’ coordination games 
constitutes an incentive-compatible tool to elicit social norms. See Burks and Krupka (2010) and Krupka et al. 
(2010) for other recent applications of the norms-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2010). 
8 If a subject assigns the highest appropriateness rating to more than one effort level, we select the effort level which 













Two features of Figure 3 are most distinctive: firstly, for a given effort choice of the co-
worker, the most appropriate level of effort in response to a high own wage is higher than the 
most appropriate level of effort in response to a low own wage (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks tests:  0.003 p =  when the co-worker chooses 1 unit of effort;  0.000 p =  when the co-worker 
chooses 4 units of effort). These differences in the average appropriate effort levels reproduce the 
positive own-wage effect observed in GNS (see Figure 1 above), and are consistent with the 
existence of a norm of reciprocity. Secondly, when the Employer pays a high wage to both 
employees, Employee 2’s most appropriate effort response depends positively on the co-worker’s 
effort response: the average appropriate level of effort increases from 3.02 when the co-worker 
chooses 1 unit of effort to 3.92 when the co-worker chooses 4 units of effort (Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test:  0.000 p = ).
9 Thus, the perception of what constitutes an appropriate 
reciprocal response to a high wage offer is influenced by a descriptive norm which is based on 
the observation of how the co-worker behaves in similar circumstances. Overall, our norms-
elicitation experiment reveals that a social norms approach can also explain the peer effects 
observed in the GNS experiment. 
4. Disentangling Social Preferences and Social Norms 
4.1. The Experimental Games 
Our experiment is based on two main treatments. Subjects in the BASELINE treatment 
played the same game played by subjects in the GNS experiment. Here, as outlined in the 
previous section, a positive correlation between employees’ efforts in the high wages 
combination is consistent with both the FS model and social norms compliance. To disentangle 
these two explanations we introduce the RANDOM treatment, where the FS model predicts no 
correlation between employees’ efforts while the social norms-based explanation may still be 
consistent with positive peer effects.  
Subjects in the RANDOM treatment played the game used in BASELINE except that, after 
all members of the firm have made their decision, Nature randomly selects one of the two 
employees: either Employee 1 or Employee 2 with equal probability. Only the wage and effort 
                                                 
9 Employee 1’s behavior does not systematically affect appropriateness ratings when the Employer pays different 
wages to the employees (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test: p = 0.515). This is in line with the idea that the 
behavior of others has a stronger influence on the perception of what constitutes socially appropriate behavior when 
others are in comparable situations.  
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decisions regarding the selected employee are implemented. In RANDOM the payoff functions 






20 10 if Employee 1 isselected





+⋅ − ⎧ ⎪ = ⎨
+⋅ − ⎪ ⎩
    (1’) 
and employee i’s earnings are computed as: 
() 5 1 if Employee isselected






−⋅ − ⎧ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
    (2’) 
4.2. Behavioral Predictions in RANDOM: the FS Model 
For the RANDOM treatment the FS model yields dramatically different predictions relative 
to BASELINE. The predicted efforts of an inequity averse Employee 2 (with  2 / 1 2 ≥ β ) in 
RANDOM are shown in Figure 4: while the FS model still predicts a positive own-wage effect, it 
predicts no relation between employees’ efforts. Intuitively, in the RANDOM treatment only the 
state of the world where Employee 2 is selected matters for an inequity averse Employee 2, as in 
the state of the world where she is not selected her actions cannot affect the distribution of 
earnings. In the state of the world where Employee 2 is selected the co-worker’s effort and wage 
have no impact on the distribution of earnings, and hence they do not affect the choices of an 
inequity averse Employee 2.
 11 
Figure 4: FS predictions for the RANDOM treatment 
 
Predicted effort choices of a superiority averse Employee 2 
( 2 / 1 2 ≥ β ). 
                                                 
10 Note that a constant is added to the Employer’s payoff in RANDOM. As explained in detail in the next sub-
section, this is done to refine our theoretical predictions for the RANDOM treatment. 
11 The prediction of no correlation between employees’ efforts in RANDOM is robust across models of social 
preferences where utilities are defined over outcomes. However, if utilities are defined over expected outcomes, as in 
Trautmann (2009), employees’ efforts may be correlated. In order to exclude this possibility we added 20 points to 
the Employer’s payoff such that Employee 2 is worse off than the Employer in expectation and thus is generally 
unwilling to supply effort above the minimal level in any contingency.   
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4.3. Behavioral Predictions in RANDOM: the Social Norms Approach  
What does the social-norms approach predict about Employee 2’s effort decisions in the 
RANDOM treatment? Since high (low) wage offers still represent a kind (unkind) action by the 
Employer, the injunctive norm of reciprocity should have bite in the RANDOM treatment, and 
induce employees to respond with higher effort to higher wages. Moreover, because ex ante (i.e. 
before Nature selects one of the two employees) Employee 1’s actions still indicate how she 
would respond to the Employer’s wage offer, they may exert an influence on Employee 2’s 
perception of what constitutes an appropriate reciprocal response to the wage they are offered. 
Thus, the social-norms approach may yield similar predictions in RANDOM and BASELINE. In 
particular, such a framework may still predict that Employee 2’s effort decisions are positively 
influenced by the co-worker’s decisions. 
To substantiate this prediction, we conducted a second norms-elicitation experiment using 
the same procedures used for the norms-elicitation experiment described in the previous section. 
We recruited 47 new subjects who were given a description of four situations reproducing four of 
the sixteen possible contingencies faced by Employees 2 in RANDOM. The situations 
corresponded to those used in the norms-elicitation experiment for the GNS game. For each 
situation and for each possible effort choice available to Employee 2 subjects rated whether an 
effort choice was socially appropriate or socially inappropriate using the same 4-point scale 
described above. Subjects were paid £5 for their participation, plus an additional £3 if their 
appropriateness rating for one randomly selected situation and effort choice matched the modal 
rating of other subjects for the corresponding situation and choice.  
The main results of our second norms-elicitation experiment are shown in Figure 5. As for 
Figure 3, we computed the average effort that our 47 raters would expend in each situation if they 
selected the level of effort that they indicated as the most socially appropriate for each situation.
12 
                                                 
12 As for Figure 3, if two or more effort levels received the highest appropriateness rating we used the effort level 
yielding the highest material payoff to the subject. Subjects’ appropriateness ratings are summarized in Appendix A1.  
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Figure 5: Socially most appropriate effort choices in RANDOM  
 
Effort choices that the 47 raters would make on average if they chose the 
most socially appropriate effort level in the four situations they evaluated. 
As in Figure 3, Figure 5 exhibits a clear reciprocity norm: the level of effort which is on 
average judged as most appropriate when the own wage is high is higher than the level of effort 
judged as most appropriate when the own wage is low (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks 
tests:  0.000 p =  both when the co-worker chooses 1 and 4 units of effort). Also, the level of effort 
that is perceived as the most appropriate response to a high wage offer depends positively on the 
co-worker’s effort: the most appropriate effort response to a high wage increases from 2.87 when 
the co-worker chooses 1 unit of effort to 3.62 when the co-worker chooses 4 units of effort 
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test:  0.000 p = ).
13 
The key aspect of our treatment comparison is the relation between employees’ efforts in 
the wage combination where both wages are high. A positive relation between efforts in 
BASELINE, but not in RANDOM, is consistent with the FS model, while a positive relation in 
both BASELINE and RANDOM is inconsistent with the FS model and suggests a social norms-
based explanation for the observed effects.  
4.4. Implementation of the Experiment 
Both treatments of the experiment were implemented in two parts. In the first part the 
relevant experimental game was implemented using the strategy method, as in GNS, while in the 
second part the same game was played in direct-response mode, i.e. subjects had to make 
decisions in response to the decisions actually made by other players. In both parts of the 
experiment we implemented a one-shot version of the relevant game, which was described to 
subjects using the same labor market frame that we use throughout the text. At the beginning of 
                                                 
13 In RANDOM Employee 1’s behavior affects appropriateness ratings even when the Employer pays different 













the experiment subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two parts, but detailed 
information about the second part was only given once everyone had completed the first part. 
Subjects remained matched with the same participants throughout the whole experiment, and any 
information about outcomes from the first part of the experiment was only given at the end of the 
second part. Subjects knew from the beginning that only one randomly determined part of the 
experiment would be taken into consideration for determining earnings. 
The empirical analysis presented in the next section will be based on choices elicited with 
the strategy method in the first part of the experiment. In fact, Part One of the experiment 
provides a rich source of data for examining how subjects in the role of Employee 2 respond to 
situations that differ in the wage they are offered and in the wage and effort of the co-worker. 
Part Two of the experiment is used to address concerns that decisions elicited by the strategy 
method do not differ systematically from those elicited by the direct response method. 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students from a wide range of disciplines recruited through 
the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). No subject took part in more than one 
session. We conducted a first wave of experiments in autumn 2009: for each treatment we ran 
seven sessions, with 9 or 12 participants per session and a total of 81 subjects (27 firms) per 
treatment. We increased the sample size in the RANDOM treatment by conducting six additional 
sessions in autumn 2010 with 9, 12 or 15 participants per session and a total of 72 subjects (24 
firms). Thus, including the data from GNS, we observe behavior in 55 firms in the BASELINE 
setup and 51 firms in the RANDOM setup. Subjects were given detailed instructions about the 
experiment, had to solve control questions before proceeding to the decision stage of the 
experiment, and could use at any time during the experiment an on-screen electronic calculator 
(the  What-if-calculator) to compute their and other players’ payoffs. We provide a detailed 
description of the procedures used in the experiment in Appendix B1, where we also reproduce 
the experimental instructions.  
The experimental sessions lasted 75 minutes on average. All participants were endowed 
with an initial amount of 95 points in each part of the experiment, and earnings from the decision 
task (which could be negative) were added to this initial amount.
14 At the end of the session, the 
                                                 
14 Note that subjects in the role of the Employer could incur losses from the decision task. The initial endowment 
outweighed any possible losses.   
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final point earnings were converted into British Pounds at a rate of £0.10 per point. Subjects were 
paid in private and in cash at the end of each session. Subject earnings ranged from £6.10 to 
£13.90, averaging £10.46.  
5. Results 
All data presented in this section are from Part One of the experiment where subjects’ 
decisions were elicited using the strategy method. In Part Two subjects performed in direct-
response mode the decision task they had performed in Part One. To check whether choices 
elicited with the strategy method differ systematically from those elicited with the direct-response 
method, we compare a subject’s choice in Part Two at a node of the game tree actually reached 
during the experiment with the choice he or she made at that node in Part One. We find that 
across our two treatments 79 percent of Employers, 86 percent of Employees 1 and 87 percent of 
Employees 2 made the same choices in the two parts of the experiment.
15 These results are in line 
with evidence from experimental studies that have used both the direct response method and the 
strategy method. These studies show that eliciting choices with the strategy method does not 
introduce systematic biases in behavior (for a review see Brandts and Charness, 2009). In 
particular, Gächter and Thöni (2010) show that the two elicitation methods produce very similar 
results in a trilateral gift-exchange game. 
In our experiments Employers can choose from four possible wage combinations. Of the 78 
Employers, 12 percent paid a high wage to both employees, 14 percent paid a high wage to one 
employee and a low wage to the other, and 74 percent paid a low wage to both.
16 The 78 
Employees 1 who participated in our experiments expended on average more effort if they were 
paid a high wage than a low wage ( 0.001 p <  in all comparisons).
17 Their effort decisions were 
instead not systematically affected by the wage offered to Employee 2 ( 0.317 p >  in all 
                                                 
15 In BASELINE 63 percent of Employers, 78 percent of Employees 1 and 74 percent of Employees 2 made the same 
choices in the two parts of the experiment. In RANDOM 88 percent of Employers, 90 percent of Employees 1 and 
94 percent of Employees 2 made the same choices in the two parts of the experiment 
16 There may be a number of reasons why employers may want to introduce pay differentials even in the absence of 
productivity differences between employees. For example, employers may find it optimal to choose unequal wages if 
they believe workers will supply high effort only if they are paid more than co-workers, or if employers think that 
some employees will respond reciprocally whereas others will not and employers therefore try their luck by using a 
“mixed payment strategy”. In fact, Gächter and Thöni (2010) find that employers choose unequal wages relatively 
often in their trilateral gift-exchange game. 
17 Unless reported otherwise, all p-values in the paper are based on two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks 
tests using each Employee as an independent observation.  
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comparisons). In the rest of the section we examine the effort decisions made by the 78 
Employees 2 who participated in our experiments. 
5.1. Peer Effects: Social Norms or Social Preferences? BASELINE vs. RANDOM 
Figure 6 displays the average effort of Employees 2. The top panel of Figure 6 displays the 
effort choices in the BASELINE treatment (top-right panel) and, for comparison, the effort 
choices in the GNS experiment already shown in Figure 1 (top-left panel). The bottom panels 
display the effort choices in the two waves of experiments of the RANDOM treatment. 
Figure 6: Employee 2 Average Effort – GNS, BASELINE & RANDOM 
 
 
Employee 2 average effort per wage combination disaggregated by different levels of the co-worker’s effort.  
A striking feature of the top panels of Figure 6 is the similarity of our BASELINE data with 
the data from GNS. First, consider the own-wage effect: in our BASELINE treatment Employees 2 
increase their effort when they are paid a high wage. Employee 2’s effort when the own wage is 16 
(averaging across contingencies, i.e. across the eight front bars of the top-right panel of Figure 6) is 







1 2 3 4







RANDOM 2009 (n=27)  RANDOM 2010 (n=24) 
GNS (n=28)  
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is highly significant ( 001 . 0 < p ).
18 In fact, for each combination of co-worker’s wage and co-
worker’s effort level shown in Figure 6, the mean increase in Employee 2’s effort after an increase 
in the own wage differs from zero at  0.026 p < .
19  
A positive own-wage effect is also observed in the RANDOM treatment (bottom panels of 
Figure 6). Combining the data from the two waves of the RANDOM experiments and averaging 
across contingencies with the same own wage we find that increasing Employees 2’s wage from 
16 to 32 increases effort by about 0.292 on average,  and  the  effect  is  highly  significant                  
( 0.001 p < ).
20 The own-wage effect in RANDOM is however smaller than the one observed in 
BASELINE (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test:  0.008 p = ). In fact, the fraction of 
Employees 2 who behave ‘non-selfishly’ (i.e. who make at least one non-minimal effort choice) 
is significantly lower in RANDOM than in BASELINE (29 percent vs. 63 percent, 
2(1) 8.21 χ = , 
0.004 p = ). This latter finding is difficult to reconcile with the FS model as the threshold value of 
the advantageous inequality parameter  2 β  by which Employees 2 are predicted to expend non-
minimal effort is the same in both treatments.
21  
Turning to peer effects, the FS model predicts a positive correlation between employees’ 
efforts when both wages are high in BASELINE, but not in RANDOM. Our norms-elicitation 
procedure, however, reveals that the co-worker’s behavior affects the perception of what 
constitutes appropriate behavior in both treatments. Hence, social norms compliance predicts a 
positive relation between employees’ efforts in both treatments.  
Figure 6 shows that in BASELINE Employee 2’s effort in the high wage combination 
increases with the co-worker’s effort. Employee 2’s average effort increases from 1.44 when the 
co-worker chooses 1 unit of effort to 2.11 when the co-worker chooses 4 units of effort. A Page 
                                                 
18 By comparison, in GNS increasing Employees 2’s wage from 16 to 32 significantly increased average effort from 
1.19 to 1.69. The own-wage effect in BASELINE is not significantly different from the one observed in GNS 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test: p = 0.569). 
19 The p-values range from 0.0255 for the case where the co-worker is paid a high wage and supplies minimal effort 
to 0.0001 for the case where the co-worker is paid a low wage and supplies 3 units of effort. 
20 For each combination of co-worker’s wage and co-worker’s effort level shown in Figure 6, the p-values range from 
0.034 for the case where the co-worker is paid a high wage and supplies minimal effort to 0.0009 for the cases where 
the co-worker is paid a low wage and supplies 3 or 4 units of effort and the case where she is paid a high wage and 
supplies 4 units of effort. 
21 The fact that there are fewer ‘non-selfish’ Employees 2 in RANDOM than in BASELINE may however reflect the 
fact that individuals care about ‘expected’ inequity, as in Trautmann (2009). In RANDOM these individuals are 
predicted to choose minimal effort most of the times, and this may explain why we seem to have a lower fraction of 
‘non-selfish’ Employees 2 in RANDOM.   
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test for ordered alternatives shows that the effect is highly significant ( 0.004 p = ).
22 In the first 
wave of RANDOM experiments conducted in autumn 2009 we find that Employees 2 slightly 
increase their effort as the co-worker expends higher effort: from an average of 1.37 when the co-
worker chooses 1 unit of effort to an average of 1.59 when the co-worker chooses 4 units of 
effort. However, this effect is not significant according to a Page test for ordered alternatives        
( 0.222 p = ). In the second wave of RANDOM experiments conducted in autumn 2010 we find a 
non-monotonic relation between employees’ efforts: Employee 2’s average effort increases from 
1.29 when the co-worker chooses 1 unit of effort to 1.42 when the co-worker chooses 4 units of 
effort. However, the effect is again not statistically significant according to a Page test for 
ordered alternatives ( 0.336 p = ).
23 In fact, in RANDOM only four out of fifty-one Employees 2 
monotonically increase their effort when the co-worker chooses higher effort in the high wages 
combination. By comparison, pooling the data from GNS and BASELINE nineteen out of fifty-
five Employees 2 monotonically increase their effort with the co-worker’s effort in the high 
wages combination. This difference in proportions is highly significant (
2(1) 11.10 χ = ,  0.001 p=
). Overall, these results suggest that the FS model organizes well the peer effects observed in our 
experiment. While our norms-elicitation experiments have documented the existence of clear 
social norms in our experimental environment, our behavioral data suggest that individuals do not 
conform to the norms' prescriptions in RANDOM, where these prescriptions conflict with the 
predictions of the FS model. 
This suggests that the social preferences approach is a parsimonious explanation of peer 
effects in pro-social behavior in our setting. But are peer effects robust to asymmetries in how 
employees are treated? This question is legitimate because we derived peer effects in a highly 
stylized setting where employees are treated in a generous way and receive equal wages. Our 
conclusions about peer effects might only hold for that special case. We address this concern in 
the next section.  
                                                 
22 By comparison, GNS found that Employees 2’s effort increased from an average of 1.39 units when the co-
worker’s effort was 1 to an average of 2.04 units when the co-worker’s effort was 4. Applying a Page test for ordered 
alternatives to their data shows that this effect is also highly significant (p < 0.001). 
23 We obtain the same result if we combine the data from the two waves of RANDOM and conduct a Page test for 
ordered alternatives using 51 independent observations: p = 0.198.  
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6. How Robust Are Peer Effects?  
To address whether peer effects are robust when employees are treated generously but do 
not receive equal wages, we designed an ASYMMETRIC treatment where employees earn 
slightly different wages in the high wages condition.
24 Subjects play the same game used in 
BASELINE except that, while the Employer can still choose a wage of 16 or 32 for Employee 1, 
the wage the Employer pays to Employee 2 can be either 16 or 30. Thus, in the wage 
combination where both wages are high Employee 1 is paid a wage of 32 and Employee 2 a 
slightly lower wage of 30. With this small perturbation in Employee 2’s high wage the FS model 
still predicts a positive relation between employees’ efforts in the wage combination where both 
employees receive a high wage (see Appendix A2 for details). To assess how norms are affected 
by these wage asymmetries, we also conducted a norms-elicitation experiment using the same 
experimental procedures as above, but with 46 new subjects.
25 
Figure 7 shows the average effort that the raters considered as the most socially appropriate 
in each of the four situations they evaluated.
26 Note that the perception of what constitutes an 
appropriate response to a high wage offer is positively influenced by the co-worker’s effort: the 
most appropriate effort response to an own wage of 30 increases from 2.74 when the co-worker 
chooses 1 unit of effort to 3.74 when the co-worker chooses 4 units of effort (Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test:  0.000 p = ). Moreover, this average increase by 1 unit of effort across 
these two situations does not differ significantly from the corresponding average increase in 
BASELINE (Wilcoxon rank-sum test:  0.724 p = ). Thus, and perhaps surprisingly, the norms-
                                                 
24 Of course, also in the previous treatments we had wage combinations where employees are treated asymmetrically 
(where one employee gets a wage of 16 and the other 32). However, for these wage combinations no non-minimal 
effort is predicted in the first place. Therefore we focus on the case where both employees are treated generously. 
25 Asymmetric wages may introduce “moral wiggle room” opportunities (Dana et al. 2007) that may eliminate the 
descriptive norm regulating the relationship between employees’ efforts. The reason is that employees are now in 
different situations and what one employee does may no longer provide a relevant benchmark for what is appropriate 
behavior by the other. Dana et al. (2007) find evidence of exploitation of moral wriggle room possibilities in variants 
of the dictator game. Haisley and Weber (2010) show that people adopt favorable attitudes towards ambiguous risk 
when this can excuse self-interested behavior. Thöni and Gächter (2011) observe that subjects in a trilateral gift-
exchange game decrease their effort strongly when they observe a co-worker who expends less effort than them, but 
barely increase effort when they observe that the co-worker expends more effort. Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) find that 
individuals faced with competing behavioral motivations in a trust game comply with the motivation that best suits 
their own self-interest. Also related is the finding that individuals prefer to quietly opt out from dictator games if 
given the opportunity to do so (e.g., Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Lazear et al., 2010). Other related studies 
also point to the existence of a self-serving or egocentric bias when one’s self-interest is at stake: see Konow (2005) 
for an overview and related literature. In the context of the gift exchange game, see Charness and Haruvy (2000). 
26 As before, we used the effort level maximizing the subject’s material payoff in case of ties in the appropriateness 
ratings of two or more effort levels. Subjects’ appropriateness ratings by situation are summarized in Appendix A1.  
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elicitation experiment suggests that the perception of what constitutes appropriate behavior 
depends on the co-worker’s effort, even in the presence of small asymmetries in wages. 
Figure 7: Socially most appropriate effort choices in ASYMMETRIC  
 
Effort choices that the 46 raters would make on average if they chose the 
most socially appropriate effort level in the four situations they evaluated. 
We ran seven experimental sessions using 81 new subjects using the same procedures as 
described in Section 4. Figure 8 shows the average effort of the twenty-seven Employees 2 in the 
ASYMMETRIC treatment.  
Figure 8: Employee 2 Average Effort – ASYMMETRIC Treatment 
 
Employee 2 average effort per wage combination disaggregated by 
different levels of the co-worker’s effort (n=27). 
As in our two other treatments, there are clear own-wage effects.
27 More interestingly, in 
the wage combination where both employees get a high wage Employee 2’s effort is positively 
correlated to the co-worker’s effort. A Page test for ordered alternatives confirms that Employee 
2’s effort increases as the co-worker’s effort increases ( 0.021 p = ). We conclude that the peer 
effects observed in GNS and our BASELINE treatment are robust to small asymmetries in 
wages. 
                                                 
27 When the co-worker is paid a high wage of 32 and supplies minimal effort Employee 2 does not increase her effort 
significantly when her wage is increased from 16 to 30 (p = 0.694). Otherwise, the own-wage effect significantly 













The observed peer effect is consistent with FS predictions. Thus, our main conclusion that 
social preferences are a parsimonious explanation of peer effects is robust to small asymmetries in 
how employees are treated. Moreover, this experiment shows that elicited norms are also robust to 
small wage asymmetries (which arguably invite moral wiggle room opportunities).  
7. Discussion & Conclusions 
Several experimental studies have shown that many individuals engage in costly pro-social 
behavior. Some studies have found that individuals’ willingness to behave pro-socially depends on 
the extent to which they observe pro-social behavior on the part of others. Our study examines 
whether these behavioral regularities are best organized by a social preferences approach (the Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999 model), or by compliance to social norms. Using an experimental procedure 
recently introduced by Krupka and Weber (2010) to identify social norms, we find evidence for 
the empirical relevance of social norms in all our experiments. However, behavior conforms to 
elicited norms only when not in conflict with the FS prediction. Thus, we conclude that inequity 
aversion is a parsimonious explanation of peer effects in pro-social behavior in our setting.  
While the observed patterns of pro-social behavior within each treatment are well organized 
by the FS model, we also observe differences across treatments in the proportion of individuals 
who engage in pro-social behavior. The proportion of employees who expend non-minimal effort 
is significantly lower in RANDOM than in BASELINE despite the fact that the threshold value of 
the advantageous inequity parameter by which an employee is predicted to expend non-minimal 
effort is the same in both treatments, and that subjects are randomly assigned to treatment 
conditions. These effects are more difficult to reconcile with the FS model predictions, and are 
reminiscent of findings from a number of studies pointing out that, while social preferences 
models can be successful in organizing aggregate deviations from self-interested behavior in 
different games, they are less successful in predicting when and whether an individual will deviate 
from self-interest (e.g., Blanco et al., forthcoming; Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). 
Our study contributes to a hitherto small literature that explores the relative predictive 
power of social norms and social preferences models in a variety of experimental settings. For 
example, Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) have proposed an experimental design that allows to 
examine the extent to which conditional cooperativeness in public goods game experiments can 
be attributed to reciprocity rather than to ‘normative conformity’, i.e. conformity to others’  
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actions because these are perceived as a guide to what is socially appropriate. They find evidence 
of the existence of conformity, but they also find that individual behavior responds to a greater 
extent to reciprocity than to conformity.
28 On the other hand, several anomalies found in variants 
of the dictator game challenge the predictive power of social preferences models: for example, 
List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) study dictator games where the payoff space is expanded to 
include opportunities for the dictator to take money from the recipient. They find that these 
‘taking opportunities’ are selected by many people, and that those who do not select them still 
give less to the recipient than in the standard game. This ‘generosity reversal’ challenges a social 
preferences-based explanation of dictator giving. A social norms-based approach, however, can 
organize these anomalies: Krupka and Weber (2010) show that perceptions of what constitutes 
appropriate behavior differ across games with and without taking opportunities. Thus, individuals 
who care for social norms compliance should behave differently in the two versions of the game. 
The fact that social norms compliance seems to organize behavioral regularities quite well 
in some experimental settings (e.g., in dictator game experiments), but not so well in others (e.g., 
in our trilateral gift-exchange game) is an interesting finding that deserves further investigation.
29 
A possible interpretation is that social norms may have more behavioral bite in non-strategic 
settings such as dictator games where individuals may find it natural to follow simple rules of 
conduct that prescribe socially appropriate behavior. In more complex social environments, such 
as in our gift-exchange games, social norm identification and compliance may not be so 
straightforward. Whereas our norms-elicitation experiments reveal clear patterns in the way 
individuals evaluate the appropriateness of different actions in our games, it may be less clear to 
subjects how to act on these in the presence of a number of relevant, and possibly conflicting, 
motivational forces (e.g. self-interest, reciprocity considerations, concerns over distributions of 
outcomes, compliance with social norms). Our data suggest that in the presence of conflicting 
motivations, subjects deviate from self-interested behavior in directions predicted by inequity 
aversion. 
                                                 
28 Also see Brandts and Fatas (2004) and Carpenter (2004) on the role of conformity in public goods games. 
29 That the nature of pro-social behavior in dictator games differs from that in other settings is also suggested by a 
recent study by van der Weele et al. (2010). They find that reciprocal behavior in trust games (Berg et al., 1995) and 
moonlighting games (Abbink et al., 2000) is robust to experimental manipulations that have been shown to reduce 
generosity in dictator games.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A  
Appendix A1 contains summaries of subjects’ social appropriateness ratings in the four situations 
that they were asked to evaluate during the norms-elicitation experiments. Data are presented 
disaggregated by treatment. Appendix A2 contains predictions of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
model in the treatment ASYMMETRIC. 
Appendix A1 – Social appropriateness ratings in the norms-elicitation experiments 
The three tables below summarize subjects’ appropriateness ratings in the three norms-
elicitation experiments. The exposition of results follows Krupka and Weber (2010). 
Each table is divided by thick solid lines into four areas corresponding to the four different 
situations that subjects were asked to evaluate. For each situation, subjects had to evaluate 
whether each of the four possible effort levels available to Employee 2 was “very socially 
inappropriate” (indicated with a – in the tables), “somewhat socially inappropriate” (-), somewhat 
socially appropriate” (+), or “very socially appropriate” (++). The first column in each area 
(containing bold numbers ranging from -1 to +1) reports the mean of the social appropriateness 
ratings: these were converted into numerical scores assigning value -1 to “very socially 
inappropriate”, value -1/3 to “somewhat socially inappropriate”, value +1/3 to “somewhat 
socially appropriate”, and value +1 to “very socially appropriate”. The next four columns report 
the distribution of responses for each given effort level. Shaded cells indicate the modal response 
of the corresponding row.  
Stars in the tables report significance levels of Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests (* = 10%; ** = 
5%; ***= 1%.). Starts reported in the same cell as the mean of the social appropriateness ratings 
are significance levels of Wilcoxon matched pairs tests comparing the distribution of responses 
across situations where the own wage varies, ceteris paribus. Stars reported in the last column of 
each table are significance levels of Wilcoxon matched pairs tests comparing situations where the 
co-worker’s effort varies, ceteris paribus.  
 





Empl. 1 effort = 1  Empl. 1 effort = 4 
Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
test  avg  --  -  + ++ avg --  - +  ++ 
w1=32 
w2=16 
1  -.268  0.37 0.29 0.20 0.14  -.320  0.31  0.37 0.29 0.02   
2  .046  0.08  0.41 0.37 0.14  .542  0 0.14  0.41  0.45 *** 
3  .163  0.10 0.23 0.49 0.18  .255  0 0.29  0.53 0.18   




***  0.61 0.23 0.06 0.10 -.908
***  0.88 0.10  0.02  0  *** 
2  -.111
*  0.12  0.47 0.37 0.04 -.386
***  0.16  0.76 0.08  0  *** 
3  .203  0.04 0.25 0.57 0.14  .307  0 0.12  0.80 0.08   
4  .359  0.14 0.19 0.16 0.51  .974
***  0 0  0.04  0.96 *** 













Empl. 1 effort = 1  Empl. 1 effort = 4 
Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
test  avg  --  -  + ++ avg --  - +  ++ 
w1=32 
w2=16 
1  .305  0.13 0.21 0.23 0.43  -.078  0.22 0.30  0.32 0.15   
2  .347  0.02 0.19 0.53 0.26  .461  0.04 0.17  0.34  0.45 *** 
3  -.050  0.06  0.55 0.28 0.11  .078  0.04  0.43 0.40 0.13   




***  0.57 0.21 0.09 0.13 -.830
***  0.85 0.09  0.2  0.04  *** 
2  .021
***  0.00  0.57 0.32 0.11 -.319
***  0.11  0.81 0.04 0.04  *** 
3  .404
***  0.00 0.21 0.47 0.32  .248
*  0.02 0.17  0.72 0.08   
4  .333
***  0.17 0.13 0.23 0.47  .801
***  0.04 0.00  0.17  0.79 *** 
-- very socially inappropriate; - somewhat socially inappropriate; + somewhat socially appropriate; ++ very socially appropriate. 
 





Empl. 1 effort = 1  Empl. 1 effort = 4 
Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
test  avg  --  -  + ++ avg --  - +  ++ 
w1=32 
w2=16 
1  -.348  0.50 0.22 0.09 0.19  -.232  0.33  0.33 0.21 0.13   
2  -.043  0.06  0.48 0.41 0.04  .522  0.00 0.11  0.50 0.39  *** 
3  .116  0.02 0.37 0.52 0.09  .188  0.00  0.41 0.39 0.20   
4  .087  0.33 0.13 0.13 0.41  -.377  0.43 0.33  0.11  0.13  ** 
w1=32 
w2=32 
1  -.348  0.56 0.11 0.11 0.22 -.826
***  0.80 0.13  0.07  0.00  *** 
2  -.072  0.07  0.56 0.28 0.09 -.333
***  0.11  0.80 0.07 0.02  *** 
3  .087  0.04 0.37 0.50 0.09  .319
*  0.02 0.09  0.78 0.11   
4  .101  0.24 0.24 0.15 0.37  .826
***  0.04 0.00  0.13  0.83 *** 





Appendix A2 – Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predictions in ASYMMETRIC 
The predictions of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model in the treatment ASYMMETRIC depend 
on the threshold value of Employee 2’s superiority aversion parameter β2. There are four possible 
thresholds of β2, illustrated in Figure A2.1, and for all of them a positive correlation between 
employees’ effort emerges in the high wages combination.  
Figure A2.1: FS predictions – ASYMMETRIC treatment 
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2 2 19 / 1 19 / 10 2 / 1 α β + ≤ ≤  
2 2 4 / 1 8 / 5 α β + ≥
22 2 10/19 1/19 5/9 1/9 αβ α +≤ ≤ +
22 2 5/9 1/9 5/8 1/4 αβ α +≤ ≤ +  
  26
Appendix B (online only) 
Appendix B1 contains the instructions and material used in the behavioral experiments, as well as 
a detailed description of the experimental procedures. Appendix B2 contains the instructions and 
material used in the norms elicitation experiments. 
 
Appendix B1 - Instructions & Experimental Procedures 
Instructions and all material given or read to subjects during the behavioral experiments are 
reproduced at the end of this Appendix for the BASELINE treatment.  
The following experimental procedures were observed in all treatments. Upon arrival 
subjects were given instructions informing them that the experiment consisted of two parts. After 
these preliminary instructions were read aloud by the experimenter, subjects were given a written 
set of instructions for Part One of the experiment and they had 15 minutes to read through the 
instructions. Then, the experimenter read aloud a briefer précis outlining the most important 
points contained in the instructions.  
Part One of the experiment then began with subjects being randomly assigned to a group 
and a role. All decisions were made anonymously, and neither during nor after the experiment 
were subjects informed about the identity of the other members of their group. Before proceeding 
to the decision stage, subjects were guided through two role-specific video presentations which 
carefully illustrated the main features of the decision screens they were going to use during the 
experiment.
30 The first video presentation explained the functioning of an on-screen electronic 
calculator (the What-if-calculator) that subjects could use to compute their and other players’ 
payoffs. At the end of the first video presentation, subjects were asked to solve a set of control 
questions and they could not enter the decision stage unless they had solved all the questions 
correctly. The second video presentation showed subjects how to enter their choices in a Decision 
Table and explained once again the structure of the game and the strategy method.  
Once everyone in the room had completed their choices for Part One of the experiment, but 
without revealing any outcomes, instructions for Part Two were distributed. Subjects again read 
through the instructions on their own before a briefer précis was read aloud. Part Two of the 
experiment began with a short video presentation showing subjects how to enter choices in the 
                                                 
30 Video presentations were shown to subjects individually in z-Tree. Video presentations and the software are 
available upon request.  
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Decision Table and explaining once more the structure of the game. Subjects then proceeded to 
the decision stage: participants in the role of Employers made their decisions first, while other 
participants were waiting. After all Employers had made a decision, participants in the role of 
Employee 1 learned the choices made by the Employer in their group and made an effort 
decision. Finally, after all Employees 1 had made a decision, participants in the role of Employee 
2 learned the choices made by the other members of their group and chose an effort level. Once 
everyone in the room had made a decision in Part Two of the experiment a computer screen 
showed subjects the firm members’ decisions and their own earnings from the two parts of the 
experiment. A coin was then tossed to determine whether all participants in the session were paid 
according to earnings from Part One or Part Two. 
Preliminary Instructions (common to all treatments) 
Welcome!  
You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. It is important that you do not talk to any of the other 
participants until the experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and a monitor will come 
to your desk to answer it. 
This experiment consists of two parts: PART 1 and PART 2.  
In each part of the experiment you will be asked to make one or more decisions. Decisions that will be made in one 
part of the experiment will not affect decisions or earnings in the other part of the experiment. 
You will be informed of any outcome (including your earnings) from PART 1 and PART 2 of the experiment only 
once everyone in the room has completed PART 2 of the experiment. Therefore everyone will make their decisions 
in PART 2 of the experiment without knowing any outcome from PART 1 of the experiment. 
Only one part of the experiment will be taken into account in determining your final earnings from today’s 
experiment. At the end of PART 2 of the experiment, we will toss a fair coin. If the coin lands heads all participants 
in today’s experiment will be paid according to their earnings from PART 1 of the experiment. If the coin lands tails 
all participants in today’s experiment will be paid according to their earnings from PART 2 of the experiment.  
Your earnings will then be paid out to you in private and in cash. 
Shortly, you will receive detailed instructions about PART 1 of the experiment. You will receive detailed 
instructions about PART 2 of the experiment once everyone in the room has completed PART 1 of the experiment. 
 
Instructions for PART 1 (BASELINE) 
In PART 1 of the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. You will receive an initial endowment of 95 
points, which will be enough to cover any loss that might occur during PART 1. The points you lose will be 
subtracted from your endowment.  
At the end of the experiment we will convert your point earnings from PART 1 of the experiment into money at the 
following rate: 
1 Point = 10 Pence 
If PART 1 of the experiment will be selected for payment, your total money earnings from PART 1 will be paid out 
to you in private and in cash at the end of the experiment.  
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1. Introduction 
In PART 1 of the experiment you will be randomly matched with two other participants to form a group of three 
persons. We will refer to each group as a firm, and to the three group members as Employer, Employee 1 and 
Employee 2. You will be assigned to a firm and a role entirely at random, and the computer will inform you of your 
role before the decision-making phase of PART 1 begins. You will not be informed about who of the other 
participants are in your firm, either during or after the experiment. Therefore, all decisions are made anonymously. 
 
2. Decisions within a firm  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is as follows. 
9  First, the Employer chooses the wages to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) and Employee 2 (Wage2). The 
Employer can choose among four possible wage combinations: 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=16 and Wage2=16. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=16 and Wage2=32. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=32 and Wage2=16. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=32 and Wage2=32. 
9  Next, Employee 1 learns the wage combination chosen by the Employer, and then chooses an effort level 
(Effort1), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
9  Finally, Employee 2 learns the wage combination chosen by the Employer, and also the effort decision of 
Employee 1. Employee 2 then chooses an effort level (Effort2), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
 
3. Distribution of earnings within a firm 
Earnings within the firm are determined according to the following rules: 
Employer 
The Employer receives revenue from the effort chosen by the two Employees, and incurs costs from the wages paid 
to the two Employees. The revenue produced by each Employee equals 10 times the effort he or she chooses. The 
costs are simply the sum of the two wages the Employer pays to the Employees. The Employer’s earnings are 
therefore: 
Employer’s Earnings = 10 * (Effort1 + Effort2) – Wage1 – Wage2 
The Employer’s earnings increase with higher effort levels. The higher the wages the Employer pays to the two 
Employees, the lower are the Employer’s earnings. Note that the Employer’s earnings could be negative. 
 
Employee 1 
Employee 1 receives the wage from the Employer as revenue, and may incur an effort cost. The minimum effort 
choice of 1 is costless. Each additional unit of effort costs 5 points to the Employee. Therefore the effort cost is 
calculated as: 5 * (Effort – 1). The earnings of Employee 1 are therefore: 
Employee 1’s Earnings = Wage1 – 5 * (Effort1 – 1) 
The earnings of Employee 1 only depend on his or her own wage and effort. The higher the wage, the higher are the 
earnings. The higher the effort he or she chooses, the lower are the earnings. 
 
Employee 2 
The earnings of Employee 2 are calculated in the same way as those of Employee 1, except, of course, that Employee 
2’s earnings depend on his or her own wage (Wage2) and his or her own effort choice (Effort2):  
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HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES 
 
ASSUME THAT THE EMPLOYER CHOOSES THE FOLLOWING WAGES FOR HIS OR HER 
EMPLOYEES: 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 1 = 32 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 2 = 16 
THE EMPLOYEES CHOOSE THE FOLLOWING EFFORT: 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 1 = 2 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 2 = 3 
THIS SITUATION RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING EARNINGS: 
EMPLOYER’S EARNINGS: THE EMPLOYER RECEIVES REVENUE FROM THE EFFORT OF THE 
TWO EMPLOYEES, I.E.: 10*(2 + 3) = 50. THE EMPLOYER PAYS A TOTAL OF 48 POINTS TO THE 
EMPLOYEES. 
THE EARNINGS OF THE EMPLOYER ARE: 50 – 48 = 2. 
EMPLOYEE 1’S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 1 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 32. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 2 
HAS A COST OF 5*(2 – 1) = 5. 
THE EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEE 1 ARE: 32 – 5 = 27. 
EMPLOYEE 2’S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 2 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 16. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 3 
HAS A COST OF 5*(3 – 1) = 10. 
THE EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEE 2 ARE: 16 – 10 = 6. 
 
 
4. The Decision Task 
Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is the one described above, in PART 1 of the 
experiment we ask you to take a decision for each possible situation that may arise. Please note that one of these 
situations will be actually relevant, so make your choices carefully.  
The situations you face when making your decisions will depend on your role. 
If you are an Employer you must choose two wages, one for each Employee within the firm. You can choose 
among four possible wage combinations: 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 32; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 32. 
Depending on the choice of the Employer one of four situations will arise: 
o  Employee 1 and Employee 2 could both have a wage of 16; 
o  Employee 1 could have a wage of 16 while Employee 2 has a wage of 32; 
o  Employee 1 could have a wage of 32 while Employee 2 has a wage of 16;  
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o  Employee 1 and Employee 2 could both have a wage of 32. 
If you are Employee 1 you will be in one of these four situations. However, before knowing which of these 
situations you are actually in, you will be asked to indicate what you would do for each of the four possible 
situations you may be in. Your computer screen will contain a Decision Table as the one below: 
 
Each box represents one of the four possible situations you may be in. In each of these boxes, you must enter an 
effort choice, either 1, 2, 3 or 4. Your actual effort choice will depend on which of these four possible situations will 
actually realise, i.e. on the wage combination actually chosen by the Employer. 
Depending on the choices of the Employer and Employee 1 one of sixteen situations may arise:  
o  Employer could choose Wage1= 16 and Wage2 =16 while Employee 1 chooses 1 unit of effort; 
o  Employer could choose Wage1= 16 and Wage2 =16 while Employee 1 chooses 2 units of effort; 
o  ….and so on. 
If you are Employee 2 you will be in one of these sixteen situations. However, before knowing which of these 
situations you are actually in, you will be asked to indicate what you would do for each of the sixteen possible 
situations you may be in. Your computer screen will contain a Decision Table as the one below:  
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Each box represents one of the sixteen possible situations you may be in. In each of these boxes, you must enter 
an effort choice, either 1, 2, 3 or 4. Your actual effort choice will depend on which of these sixteen possible 
situations will actually realise, i.e. on the wage combination actually chosen by the Employer and on the effort 
actually chosen by Employee 1. 
More information about how to solve your specific Decision task will be provided to you via computer later on 
during PART 1 of the experiment, once your role has been determined. 
Note that the decision task in PART 1 of the experiment will be performed only once. 
 
5. How do we determine your actual earnings from PART 1 of the experiment? 
Although Employee 1 will take four effort decisions, only one will be relevant in determining the earnings of the 
members of the firm. Similarly, only one of the sixteen effort decisions made by Employee 2 will be actually used in 
the earnings’ computation. 
Which decision is actually relevant will be determined at the end of PART 1, once everyone in the firm has taken his 
or her decisions: the actual wage combination chosen by the Employer will determine which of the four possible 
situations is relevant for Employee 1. Employee 1’s choice in this relevant situation will determine which of the 
sixteen possible situations is relevant for Employee 2.  
You will be informed of your earnings from PART 1 at the end of the experiment. 
 
6. What happens next? 
I.  When the experiment starts you will be informed about whether you are an Employer or an Employee in 
PART 1 of the experiment. In case you are an Employee, it will be specified whether you are Employee 1 or 
Employee 2.  
II.  When you press the “Continue” button, a screen with a brief video-presentation about the main features of the 
PART 1 of the experiment will appear. In this video-presentation you will receive some information about the 
“What-if-calculator”, a tool you can use to facilitate your computations. It is important to note that no other  
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participant will be informed about your calculations and that these calculations do not have any effect on your 
earnings. 
III.  After this brief video-presentation, you will access a new screen where you will be asked to answer a few 
questions. You will have to calculate the earnings of all members of your firm for five hypothetical scenarios, 
with the help of the “What-if-calculator”. Press “Check” when you have answered all the questions. You will 
be informed about whether your answers are correct. 
IV.  Once you have answered all the questions correctly, you will be guided to a new short video-presentation that 
will give you specific information about how to enter your decisions into the Decision Table. 
V.  After that, you will finally enter the Decision Task screen. Depending on whether you are an Employer or an 
Employee you will have to choose wages or effort levels. In this screen, you will again have the possibility to 
use the “What-if-calculator”. 
VI.  When everyone has made a decision, PART 1 of the experiment will be finished. The experiment will then 
proceed to PART 2. 
 
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
Script read to subjects in PART 1 (BASELINE) 
I will now briefly summarize the content of the instructions you have just read. 
At the beginning of PART 1 of the experiment you will be randomly matched with two other participants to form a 
group of three people and you will be randomly assigned a role within this group, which we will call “firm”. You 
will be either the Employer or Employee 1 or Employee 2.  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is as follows. 
First, the Employer chooses one wage to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) and one wage to pay to Employee 2 (Wage2).  
Next, Employee 1 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee, and then chooses an effort level (Effort1). 
Finally, Employee 2 learns the wages the Employer pays to each Employee and also the effort decision of Employee 
1, and then chooses an effort level (Effort2). 
The Employer’s earnings increase with higher effort levels and decrease with higher wages. 
The Employees’ earnings increase in the wage they receive and decrease with higher effort. The earnings of each 
Employee only depend on his or her own wage and effort.  
Although the structure of the decision-making within each firm is the one I have just described, in PART 1 of 
today’s experiment we ask you to take a decision for each possible situation that may arise. This is a crucial 
point, so make sure you have understood it correctly. 
The possible situations you will face when making your decisions will depend on your role. 
If you are an Employer you must choose two wages, one for each Employee within the Firm. Thus, depending on 
the choice of the Employer one of four situations will arise: 
o  Both Employees could get a wage of 16; 
o  Both Employees could get a wage of 32; 
o  And the two situations where one Employee gets a wage of 16 while the other Employee gets a wage of 32; 
If you are Employee 1 you must indicate an effort choice for each of these four possible situations, before knowing 
which one you are actually in. Remember, one of these four decisions will be the one that is actually relevant, so 
make your choice carefully. 
Depending on the choices of the Employer and Employee 1 one of sixteen situations may arise:  
o  Both Employees get a wage of 16 and Employee 1 chooses 1 unit of effort  
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o  Both Employees get a wage of 16 and Employee 1 chooses 2 units of effort; 
o  ….and so on…  
Since there are 4 possible levels of effort and 4 possible wage combinations, 16 situations in all may arise. 
If you are Employee 2 you must indicate an effort choice for each of the sixteen possible situations. Remember, one 
of these sixteen decisions will be the one that is actually relevant, so make your choice carefully. 
Which decision is actually relevant will be determined at the end of PART 1, once everyone in the firm has taken his 
or her decisions: the actual wage combination chosen by the Employer will determine which of the four possible 
situations is relevant for Employee 1. Employee 1’s choice in this relevant situation will determine which of the 
sixteen possible situations is relevant for Employee 2. 
Please note that the decision task in PART 1 of the experiment will be performed only once. 
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
Instructions for PART 2 (BASELINE) 
In PART 2 of the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. You will receive an initial endowment of 95 
points, which will be enough to cover any loss that might occur during PART 2. The points you lose will be 
subtracted from your endowment.  
At the end of the experiment we will convert your point earnings from PART 2 of the experiment into money at the 
following rate: 
1 Point = 10 Pence 
If PART 2 of the experiment will be selected for payment, your total money earnings from PART 2 will be paid out 
to you in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. 
1. Introduction 
In PART 2 of the experiment you will be matched with the same two participants with whom you have been 
matched in PART 1. You and the two other participants will again form a group of three persons – a firm - , and you 
will keep the same role in the firm as in PART 1. That is, if you were an Employer in PART 1, you will be assigned 
the role of Employer also in PART 2. If you were an Employee 1 in PART 1, you will also be assigned the role of 
Employee 1 in PART 2. If you were an Employee 2 in PART 1, you will also be assigned the role of Employee 2 in 
PART 2. As before, you will not be informed about who of the other participants are in your firm, either during or 
after the experiment. Therefore, all decisions are made anonymously. 
 
2. Decisions within a firm  
The structure of the decision-making within each firm is the same as in PART 1 of the experiment: 
9  First, the Employer chooses the wages to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) and Employee 2 (Wage2). The 
Employer can choose among four possible wage combinations: 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=16 and Wage2=16. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=16 and Wage2=32. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=32 and Wage2=16. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=32 and Wage2=32. 
9  Next, Employee 1 learns the wage combination chosen by the Employer, and then chooses an effort level 
(Effort1), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
9  Finally, Employee 2 learns the wage combination chosen by the Employer, and also the effort decision of 
Employee 1. Employee 2 then chooses an effort level (Effort2), either 1, 2, 3 or 4.  
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3. Distribution of earnings within a firm 
Earnings within the firm are determined according to the same rules as in PART 1 of the experiment: 
Employer 
The Employer receives revenue from the effort chosen by the two Employees, and incurs costs from the wages paid 
to the two Employees. The revenue produced by each Employee equals 10 times the effort he or she chooses. The 
costs are simply the sum of the two wages the Employer pays to the Employees. The Employer’s earnings are 
therefore: 
Employer’s Earnings = 10 * (Effort1 + Effort2) – Wage1 – Wage2 
The Employer’s earnings increase with higher effort levels. The higher the wages the Employer pays to the two 
Employees, the lower are the Employer’s earnings. Note that the Employer’s earnings could be negative. 
 
Employee 1 
Employee 1 receives the wage from the Employer as revenue, and may incur an effort cost. The minimum effort 
choice of 1 is costless. Each additional unit of effort costs 5 points to the Employee. Therefore the effort cost is 
calculated as: 5 * (Effort – 1). The earnings of Employee 1 are therefore: 
Employee 1’s Earnings = Wage1 – 5 * (Effort1 – 1) 
The earnings of Employee 1 only depend on his or her own wage and effort. The higher the wage, the higher are the 
earnings. The higher the effort he or she chooses, the lower are the earnings. 
Employee 2 
The earnings of Employee 2 are calculated in the same way as those of Employee 1, except, of course, that Employee 
2’s earnings depend on his or her own wage (Wage2) and his or her own effort choice (Effort2): 
Employee 2’s Earnings = Wage2 – 5 * (Effort2 – 1) 
 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES 
 
ASSUME THAT THE EMPLOYER CHOOSES THE FOLLOWING WAGES FOR HIS OR HER 
EMPLOYEES: 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 1 = 32 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 2 = 16 
THE EMPLOYEES CHOOSE THE FOLLOWING EFFORT: 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 1 = 2 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 2 = 3 
THIS SITUATION RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING EARNINGS: 
EMPLOYER’S EARNINGS: THE EMPLOYER RECEIVES REVENUE FROM THE EFFORT OF THE 
TWO EMPLOYEES, I.E.: 10*(2 + 3) = 50. THE EMPLOYER PAYS A TOTAL OF 48 POINTS TO THE 
EMPLOYEES. 
THE EARNINGS OF THE EMPLOYER ARE: 50 – 48 = 2. 
EMPLOYEE 1’S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 1 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 32. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 2 
HAS A COST OF 5*(2 – 1) = 5. 
THE EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEE 1 ARE: 32 – 5 = 27. 
EMPLOYEE 2’S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 2 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 16. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 3 
HAS A COST OF 5*(3 – 1) = 10. 




4. The Decision Task 
Differently from PART 1, in PART 2 of the experiment Employees will be informed of the situation they are in 
before they make their effort choice. Therefore, in PART 2 of the experiment everyone will take exactly one 
decision:  
 
The Employer will choose a wage combination among four possible alternatives: 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 32; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 32. 
Next, Employee 1 will be informed of the wage combination the Employer has actually chosen and will then be 
asked to choose an effort level for that specific wage combination. If you are Employee 1, your computer screen 
will contain a Decision Table as the one below: 
 
Finally, Employee 2 will be informed of the wage combination the Employer has actually chosen, and of the effort 
that Employee 1 has actually chosen in that wage combination. Employee 2 will then be asked to choose an effort 
level for that specific combination of wages and effort chosen by the Employer and by Employee 1. If you are 
Employee 2, your computer screen will contain a Decision Table as the one below: 
 
As in PART 1 of the experiment, PART 2 decision task will be performed only once. 
5. How do we determine your actual earnings from PART 2 of the experiment? 
The wage combination chosen by the Employer and Employees’ effort choices in that wage combination will 
translate into earnings according to the rules explained at point 3 above.   
 
6. What happens next?  
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I.  PART 2 of the experiment will start with a welcome screen. By pressing the “Continue” button in that screen 
you will access another screen where you will be shown a brief video-presentation with summary information 
about your Decision Task in PART 2 of the experiment.  
II.  You will then enter the Decision Task screen. Depending on whether you are an Employer or an Employee 
you will have to choose wages or effort levels. In this screen, you will have the possibility to use the “What-if-
calculator”, as in PART 1. 
III.  When everyone has made a decision, PART 2 of the experiment will be finished. You will then be shown a 
screen informing of your earnings from PART 1 and PART 2 of the experiment. As explained in the 
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS, a coin toss will then determine whether every participant in today’s 
experiment will be paid according to their earnings from PART 1 or PART 2. 
 
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
 
Script read to subjects in PART 2 (BASELINE) 
I will now briefly summarize the content of the instructions you have just read. 
In PART 2 of the experiment you are matched with the same two participants with whom you were matched in 
PART 1. You will also keep the same role in the firm as in PART 1 of the experiment. 
The structure of the decision-making within each firm and the rules for determining earnings are the same as in 
PART 1 of the experiment. 
The only difference between PART 1 and PART 2 of the experiment is the following: while in PART 1 of the 
experiment Employees had to make their effort decisions before knowing which situation they were in, in 
PART 2 of the experiment they will learn the situation they are in before making their effort decisions. 
Therefore, in PART 2 of the experiment everyone will take exactly one decision:  
Employers will choose a wage combination among four possible alternatives: 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 16 and Wage2 = 32; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 16; 
o  Wage1 = 32 and Wage2 = 32. 
Next, Employees 1 are informed of the wage combination the Employer has actually chosen and will then be asked 
to choose an effort level for that specific wage combination.  
Finally Employees 2 will be informed of the wage combination the Employer has actually chosen. They will also be 
informed of the effort that Employee 1 has actually chosen in that wage combination. They will then be asked to 
choose an effort level for that specific combination of wages and effort chosen by the Employer and by 
Employee 1.  
The wage combination chosen by the Employer and Employees’ effort choices in that wage combination will 
determine the firm members’ earnings in PART 2 of the experiment.   
Once PART 2 will be completed, a coin toss will determine whether everyone in the room will be paid according to 
PART 1 of the experiment or according to PART 2. 
Please note that the decision task in PART 2 of the experiment will also be performed only once.  
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. 
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Appendix B2 - Instructions for the norms-elicitation experiment  
This Appendix contains the instructions used for the norms-elicitation experiment in BASELINE. 
1) General Instructions (common to all treatments) 
Welcome to the experiment! This is a study on decision making. For your participation, you will be paid a 
participation fee of £5. In addition, you may receive some additional money based on your choices and the choices of 
others during the experiment.  
If you have any questions during the study, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter to come to you. 
Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Participants 
intentionally violating the rules may be asked to leave the experiment and may not be paid.  
In a few minutes you will receive a set of paper sheets containing descriptions of a series of situations. These 
descriptions correspond to situations in which one person, “Employee 2,” must make a decision. For each situation, 
you will be given a description of the decision faced by Employee 2. This description will include several possible 
choices available to Employee 2.   
After you read the description of the situation, you will be asked to evaluate the different possible choices available 
to Employee 2 and to decide, for each of the possible choices, whether taking that choice would be “socially 
appropriate” and “consistent with moral or proper social behavior” or “socially inappropriate” and “inconsistent 
with moral or proper social behavior”. By socially appropriate, we mean behavior that most people agree is the 
“correct” or “ethical” thing to do. Another way to think about what we mean is that if Employee 2 were to select a 
socially inappropriate choice, then someone else might be angry at Employee 2 for doing so. In each of your 
responses, we would like you to answer as truthfully as possible, based on your opinions of what constitutes socially 
appropriate or socially inappropriate behavior.  
To give you an idea of how the experiment will proceed, we will go through an example and show you how you will 
indicate your responses. On the next page you will see an example of a situation.   
Example Situation 
Employee 2 is at a local coffee shop near campus. While there, Employee 2 notices that someone has left a wallet at 
one of the tables. Employee 2 must decide what to do. Employee 2 has four possible choices: take the wallet, ask 
others nearby if the wallet belongs to them, leave the wallet where it is, or give the wallet to the shop manager. 
Employee 2 can choose only one of these four options.  
The table below presents a list of the possible choices available to Employee 2. For each of the choices, please indicate 
whether you believe choosing that option is very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat 
socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, please place an “x” inside one box for 
each row.   













Take the wallet                 
Ask others nearby if the wallet 
belongs to them 
                  
Leave the wallet where it is         
Give the wallet to the shop 
manager 
    
Please make sure that you have placed one “x” in each row. 
If this were one of the situations for this study, you would consider each of the possible choices above and, for that 
choice, indicate the extent to which you believe taking that action would be “socially appropriate” and “consistent with 
moral or proper social behavior” or “socially inappropriate” and “inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior”.  
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Recall that by socially appropriate we mean behavior that most people agree is the “correct” or “ethical” thing to do.   
For example, suppose you thought that taking the wallet was very socially inappropriate, asking others nearby if the 
wallet belongs to them was somewhat socially appropriate, leaving the wallet where it is was somewhat socially 
inappropriate, and giving the wallet to the shop manager was very socially appropriate. Then you would indicate your 
responses as follows: 













Take the wallet  X       
Ask others nearby if the wallet 
belongs to them     X   
Leave the wallet where it is    X     
Give the wallet to the shop 
manager      X 
Are there any questions about this example situation or about how to indicate your responses? 
 
Your Task in Today’s Experiment 
In a few minutes you will receive a set of paper sheets containing descriptions of four situations, all dealing with 
decisions that “Employee 2”, a participant in an experiment, might have to make. For each situation, you will read a 
description of the situation and indicate whether each possible choice available to Employee 2 is socially appropriate 
or socially inappropriate. For each situation, you will indicate your responses using a table similar to the one shown 
above for the example situation. The experimenter will then collect your responses. 
 
 How Your Cash Earnings Are Determined 
At the end of the experiment today, we will select one of the four situations, by randomly drawing a number from 1 
to 4. For this situation, we will also randomly select one of the possible choices that Employee 2 could make. Thus, 
we will select both a situation and one possible choice at random. For the choice selected, we will determine which 
response was selected by the most people here today. If you give the same response as that most frequently given by 
other people, then you will receive an additional £3. This amount will be paid to you, in cash, at the conclusion of the 
experiment. For instance, if we were to select the example situation above and the possible choice “Leave the wallet 
where it is” and if your response had been “somewhat socially inappropriate” then you would receive £3, in addition 
to the £5 participation fee, if this was the response selected by most other people in today’s session. Otherwise you 
would receive only the £5 participation fee. 
If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to answer it. 
 
2) General Description of the Decision Task faced by Employee 2 (BASELINE) 
All the four situations you will be asked to evaluate deal with decisions that “Employee 2”, a participant in an 
experiment, might have to make in the decision task described below. 
In the decision task participants enter choices into a computer and earn points as explained below. All participants start 
the experiment with an endowment of 95 points, which will be enough to cover any loss that might occur during the 
experiment. The points lost by a participant during the experiment will be subtracted from that participant’s endowment. 
At the end of the experiment point earnings are converted into cash at a rate of 10p per point.  
At the beginning of the decision task, three participants are randomly matched together to form a group of three 
persons, which we will refer to as a “firm”. The matching is anonymous, meaning that neither participant will ever 
know the identity of the other participants with whom he or she is matched. Each participant is then randomly assigned  
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a role within the firm: Employer, Employee 1 or Employee 2. 
The structure of the decision-making within a firm is as follows: 
•  First,  the Employer chooses the wages to pay to Employee 1 (Wage1) and Employee 2 (Wage2). The 
Employer can choose among four possible wage combinations: 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=16 and Wage2=16. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=16 and Wage2=32. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=32 and Wage2=16. 
o  The Employer can choose to pay Wage1=32 and Wage2=32. 
•  Next, Employee 1 learns the wage combination chosen by the Employer, and then chooses an effort level 
(Effort1), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
•  Finally, Employee 2 learns the wage combination chosen by the Employer, and also the effort decision of 
Employee 1. Employee 2 then chooses an effort level (Effort2), either 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
Point earnings within a firm are determined according to the following rules: 
Employer 
The Employer receives revenue from the effort chosen by the two Employees, and incurs costs from the wages paid 
to the two Employees. The revenue produced by each Employee equals 10 times the effort he or she chooses. The 
costs are simply the sum of the two wages the Employer pays to the Employees. The Employer’s earnings are 
therefore: 
Employer’s Earnings = 10 * (Effort1 + Effort2) – Wage1 – Wage2 
The Employer’s earnings increase with higher effort levels. The higher the wages the Employer pays to the two 
Employees, the lower are the Employer’s earnings. Note that the Employer’s earnings could be negative. 
 
Employee 1 
Employee 1 receives the wage from the Employer as revenue, and may incur an effort cost. The minimum effort 
choice of 1 is costless. Each additional unit of effort costs 5 points to the Employee. Therefore the effort cost is 
calculated as: 5 * (Effort – 1). The earnings of Employee 1 are therefore: 
Employee 1’s Earnings = Wage1 – 5 * (Effort1 – 1) 
The earnings of Employee 1 only depend on his or her own wage and effort. The higher the wage, the higher are the 
earnings. The higher the effort he or she chooses, the lower are the earnings. 
Employee 2 
The earnings of Employee 2 are calculated in the same way as those of Employee 1, except, of course, that Employee 
2’s earnings depend on his or her own wage (Wage2) and his or her own effort choice (Effort2): 
Employee 2’s Earnings = Wage2 – 5 * (Effort2 – 1) 
 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR DEMONSTRATION PURPOSES 
 
ASSUME THAT THE EMPLOYER CHOOSES THE FOLLOWING WAGES FOR HIS OR HER 
EMPLOYEES: 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 1 = 16 
WAGE FOR EMPLOYEE 2 = 32 
THE EMPLOYEES CHOOSE THE FOLLOWING EFFORT:  
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EFFORT EMPLOYEE 1 = 2 
EFFORT EMPLOYEE 2 = 3 
THIS SITUATION RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING EARNINGS: 
EMPLOYER’S EARNINGS: THE EMPLOYER RECEIVES REVENUE FROM THE EFFORT OF THE 
TWO EMPLOYEES, I.E.: 10*(2 + 3) = 50. THE EMPLOYER PAYS A TOTAL OF 48 POINTS TO THE 
EMPLOYEES. 
THE EARNINGS OF THE EMPLOYER ARE: 50 – 48 = 2. 
EMPLOYEE 1’S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 1 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 16. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 2 
HAS A COST OF 5*(2 – 1) = 5. 
THE EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEE 1 ARE: 16 – 5 = 11. 
EMPLOYEE 2’S EARNINGS: EMPLOYEE 2 RECEIVES A WAGE OF 32. THE EFFORT CHOICE OF 3 
HAS A COST OF 5*(3 – 1) = 10. 
THE EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEE 2 ARE: 32 – 10 = 22. 
 
After everyone in the firm has made a decision, all three participants are informed of the choices made and are paid 
accordingly in private and in cash. 
The four situations you are asked to evaluate deal with effort decisions that Employee 2 has to make after different 
combinations of wage and effort choices made by the Employer and Employee 1.  
On each of the four attached sheets you will find a description of each situation as well as a table where you will 
indicate your responses. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
3) Decision Sheets (BASELINE) 







Please write your Participant ID Number in the space provided above. 
 
The Employer chooses a wage of  32 for Employee 1 and  16  for Employee 2.  
Employee 1 learns the wages chosen by the Employer, and then chooses  1 unit of effort . 
Employee 2 learns the wages chosen by the Employer and the effort chosen by Employee 1 and has to decide whether to 
expend 1, 2, 3 or 4 units of effort. 
 
The table below summarizes the payoffs of Employer, Employee 1 and Employee 2 when Employee 2 chooses 1, 2, 3 or 4 
units of effort. 
SITUATION 1: Employee 1 wage = 32; Employee 2 wage = 16; Employee 1 effort = 1 
Employee 2 chooses:  1 unit of effort  2 units of effort  3 units of effort  4 units of effort 
Employer earnings  -28  -18  -8  2  
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Employee 1 earnings  32  32  32  32 
Employee 2 earnings  16  11  6  1 
 
The table below presents a list of the possible choices available to Employee 2. For each of the choices, please indicate 
whether you believe choosing that option is very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially 
appropriate, or very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, please place an “x” inside one box for each row.   













1 unit of effort 
               
2 units of effort 
                  
3 units of effort 
       
4 units of effort 
    










Please write your Participant ID Number in the space provided above. 
 
The Employer chooses a wage of  32 for Employee 1 and  16  for Employee 2.  
Employee 1 learns the wages chosen by the Employer, and then chooses  4 units of effort . 
Employee 2 learns the wages chosen by the Employer and the effort chosen by Employee 1 and has to decide whether to 
expend 1, 2, 3 or 4 units of effort. 
 
The table below summarizes the payoffs of Employer, Employee 1 and Employee 2 when Employee 2 chooses 1, 2, 3 or 4 
units of effort. 
SITUATION 2: Employee 1 wage = 32; Employee 2 wage = 16; Employee 1 effort = 4 
Employee 2 chooses:  1 unit of effort  2 units of effort  3 units of effort  4 units of effort 
Employer  earnings  2  12 22 32 
Employee 1 earnings  17  17  17  17  
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Employee 2 earnings  16  11  6  1 
 
The table below presents a list of the possible choices available to Employee 2. For each of the choices, please indicate 
whether you believe choosing that option is very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially 
appropriate, or very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, please place an “x” inside one box for each row.   













1 unit of effort 
               
2 units of effort 
                  
3 units of effort 
       
4 units of effort 
    
Please make sure that you have placed one “x” in each row. 
 
 





Please write your Participant ID Number in the space provided above. 
 
The Employer chooses a wage of  32 for Employee 1 and  32  for Employee 2.  
Employee 1 learns the wages chosen by the Employer, and then chooses  1 unit of effort . 
Employee 2 learns the wages chosen by the Employer and the effort chosen by Employee 1 and has to decide whether to 
expend 1, 2, 3 or 4 units of effort. 
 
The table below summarizes the payoffs of Employer, Employee 1 and Employee 2 when Employee 2 chooses 1, 2, 3 or 4 
units of effort. 
 
 
SITUATION 3: Employee 1 wage = 32; Employee 2 wage = 32; Employee 1 effort = 1 
Employee 2 chooses:  1 unit of effort  2 units of effort  3 units of effort  4 units of effort 
Employer  earnings  -44 -34 -24 -14 
Employee 1 earnings  32  32  32  32 
Employee 2 earnings  32  27  22  17 
 
The table below presents a list of the possible choices available to Employee 2. For each of the choices, please indicate  
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whether you believe choosing that option is very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially 
appropriate, or very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, please place an “x” inside one box for each row.   













1 unit of effort 
               
2 units of effort 
                  
3 units of effort 
       
4 units of effort 
    









Please write your Participant ID Number in the space provided above. 
 
The Employer chooses a wage of  32 for Employee 1 and  32  for Employee 2.  
Employee 1 learns the wages chosen by the Employer, and then chooses  4 units of effort . 
Employee 2 learns the wages chosen by the Employer and the effort chosen by Employee 1 and has to decide 
whether to expend 1, 2, 3 or 4 units of effort. 
 
The table below summarizes the payoffs of Employer, Employee 1 and Employee 2 when Employee 2 chooses 1, 2, 
3 or 4 units of effort. 
SITUATION 4: Employee 1 wage = 32; Employee 2 wage = 32; Employee 1 effort = 4 
Employee 2 chooses:  1 unit of effort  2 units of effort  3 units of effort  4 units of effort 
Employer earnings  -14  -4  6  16 
Employee 1 earnings  17  17  17  17 
Employee 2 earnings  32  27  22  17 
 
The table below presents a list of the possible choices available to Employee 2. For each of the choices, please indicate 
whether you believe choosing that option is very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat 
socially appropriate, or very socially appropriate. To indicate your response, please place an “x” inside one box for 
each row.    
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1 unit of effort 
               
2 units of effort 
                  
3 units of effort 
       
4 units of effort 
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